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14. The Explanatory Power
of Radical Behaviorism*
HUGH LACEY AND BARRY SCHWARTZ

B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorist program has always been bold, distinctive,
significant, and far-reaching. It has also been controversial, for it has involved
commitments to the following views.
1

All human behavior is lawful. It is explicable in terms of principles (laws,
regularities, generalizations) that can be discovered and confirmed in
experimental studies in the laboratory.
2 For the bulk of human behavior, including verbal and purposive behavior,
these generalizations involve only current relations between behaviors
and environmental factors, together with a person’s past history of such
relations. Other variables, whether from physiology or from cognitive
psychology, are not needed to express these generalizations (see Skinner,
1945, for qualifications of this view).
3 In the light of these generalizations significant controls may be exerted
over human behavior, controls that, as they are progressively imple
mented, promise to resolve major social problems.
4 The achievement of widespread control, both experimental and technolo
gical, is a crucial factor, alongside prediction, in evaluating the explana
tory claims of a research program.
Skinner recognized that these commitments presuppose a particular view of
the human person. He summed it up in these words: ‘A person is not an
originating agent; he is a locus, a point at which many genetic and environmental
variables come together in a joint effort’ (Skinner, 1974, p. 168). Acknowledging
this view led him to propose a fundamental revision of our discourse about human

* This paper was prepared with the help of National Science Foundation grants SES-838604 (to HL)
and BNS82-06670 (to BS).
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persons and societal relations, a revision that challenges the assumptions that
maintain liberal social and political institutions, and indeed the way we think
about moral and political issues in general. This chapter is motivated by the
question: is there sufficient support, either theoretical or empirical, for Skinner’s
commitments for one to take his views as a serious guide to action? We will be
concerned principally with evaluating the comprehensiveness of the explanatory
power of radical behaviorist principles.

EVALUATING COMPREHENSIVENESS

How, then, can the comprehensiveness of behavior principles be assessed? Many
refuse to address this question, regarding it as nothing more than distracting
speculation, incapable of serious answer until the radical behaviorist research
program is much further along. Indeed some become impatient even with Skinner
himself when he draws out far-reaching, and thus far unsupported, implications of
radical behaviorism. They perceive that such speculation provides an easy target
for criticism, while doing little to further the science of behavior. Therefore,
before we present our main argument about how comprehensive radical behavior
ist principles are, a little needs to be said about why an assessment of comprehen
siveness is important, even, or perhaps especially, at this stage of scientific
development. There are at least three important reasons for assessing comprehen
siveness. They apply to any research program, in any science.
1

A research program (Lakatos, 1978; see Lacey, 1980, for application to
behaviorism) provides positive guidelines for research, in large part by
constraining what constitutes proper research — what are proper
methods, research strategies, and hypotheses. It can be said to be defined
by an object of inquiry (e.g., behavior), and by a broadly sketched class
of parameters whose effects it systematically and progressively investi
gates to include more, more complex, and more significant features of the
object of inquiry within its explanatory compass. It provisionally assumes
that the class of parameters it investigates is broad enough to encompass
the object of inquiry. Without a preliminary charting of the general,
fundamental features of the object"of inquiry, and a plausibility argument
that the parameters in question could fully explain it, there is no ground
for restricting inquiry in the manner required by the research program.
General methodological arguments, dissociated from the specific object of
inquiry, cannot provide such a ground (see Lacey, 1974). Thus, for
example, the study of behavioral and environmental parameters, and not
of cognitive ones, requires a substantive and not just a methodological
defense.
2 As Skinner (1971) makes clear, there is a contradiction between the
conception of human behavior that informs the behaviorist research prog
ram and that which informs dominant social practices. If the latter con
ception is correct, the behaviorist program cannot produce a comprehen
sive explanatory account of behavior. Alternatively, if the behaviorist
conception is correct, and if it were to become widely accepted, social
practices justified by the other conception would be undermined and
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displaced. There is no room for compromise here: either the behaviorist
program is importantly incomplete, or important social practices are illconceived. If the research program is incomplete, sound research must
extend beyond it to those features of behavior that cannot be encompas
sed by the program. In order to uphold any claim to the priority of the
behaviorist program then, a strong plausibility argument supporting its
comprehensiveness is essential.
3 Behaviorists tend to pursue vigorously the application of their discoveries,
and for many application constitutes the principal rationale of ex
perimental inquiry. An application is licit only if two conditions are met:
first, that it succeeds in bringing about the desired effect; and second, that
it does not produce any undesired side-effects. Experiment can settle the
first condition. To settle the second, one needs to explore the range of
variables on which the applied procedure could have an impact. Suppose,
for example, that it is true that behavior is almost exclusively controlled
by prevailing contingencies of reinforcement coupled with the organism’s
past history of reinforcement. If so, one need not look beyond the scope
of behaviorism to check for side-effects, and we could reasonably expect
that a procedure that merely recasts the prevailing contingencies would
not produce adverse effects on human beings. But our expectancy would
be different if important behaviors were not explicable in terms of be
havioral principles, but instead required, let us say, an appeal to princi
ples of cognitive psychology. Then, achieving control through an applied
procedure could well involve the modification of cognitive factors that
behavioral principles do not encompass though they may be of central
human significance. An example of this sort of side-effect is Schwartz s
(1982) demonstration that a history of reinforcement for successful indi
vidual responses impaired people’s ability to discover generalizations
efficiently. Since applied behavior analysts rarely evaluate the licitness of
applications in the light of the posits of rival research programs, or the
presuppositions that underlie dominant social practices, it follows that
their presumption of the licitness of routine application of behavioral
principles rests upon a positive assessment of the comprehensiveness of
the behaviorist program (see Lacey, 1979).

IS BEHAVIORISM COMPREHENSIVE?

Now that it is clear that an assessment of behaviorism’s comprehensiveness is
important, it is time to make the assessment. Skinner has maintained that his
commitment to comprehensiveness is required if one adopts a scientific stance
towards human beings. Certainly, its apparent plausibility is supported by the
success of radical behaviorism’s scientific research program. It has now been
demonstrated in countless experiments that there are principles of the type cited
by Skinner, and the range of their manifest exemplification continues to expand
(see Schwartz, 1984, for a review). Equally important has been the success of
applied behavior analysis, the application of experimentally derived principles to
generate control in certain institutions and social contexts.
However, these successes do not tell us how comprehensive radical behavior-
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ist principles are. That is because experimental and applied settings, those in
which the explanatory power of behavioral principles is clear, have significant
characteristics that are lacking in a large and important class of ordinary social
settings. They tend to be relatively simple, with few salient variables operating.
They are constructed by some human beings to satisfy certain explicit ends, ends
that involve the successful control of other human beings (or experimental ani
mals). How comprehensive behavior principles are cannot be settled only by
investigation of experimental and applied settings, just as the comprehensiveness
of the physics of motion is not settled by the study of objects in a vacuum, or by
the construction of cannons. We believe that there are clear limits to the compre
hensiveness of behavior principles, and we now turn to the kind of argument that
can support this negative assessment. The issue is difficult and complex; it is the
kind of issue where a missing of the minds frequently occurs. The reason for this
is that we are not asking whether behavior principles currently are comprehen
sive. On this there is virtually no disagreement; everyone acknowledges that there
is still much work to be done. Rather, what we are asking, and answering
negatively, is whether behavior principles are in principle comprehensive. To
show that behavior principles cannot produce a comprehensive account of be
havior, we must show that there are behaviors that principles consistent with the
constraints of the research program cannot explain. How can this be done?
There is both constancy and change as a research program unfolds. Its
conception of the object of inquiry and of the parameters worthy of investigation
remains more or less constant. The behaviorist commitment to behavior as the
object of inquiry, and to certain current and past environmental factors as para
meters, is an example of this constancy. While this formulation of the constraints
of the research program is quite general, it does conflict with other conceptions,
for example, that verbal and purposive behavior are expressions of mental events.
While what should be studied is not logically entailed by the behaviorist concep
tion, it does set limits. Reinforcement, punishment, discriminative control, etc.
can be studied; mental states cannot. The research program imposes constraints;
it rules out some things.
On the other hand, the appropriate, specific set of parameters can change. It
can expand, as when Skinner added the domain of operant to that of respondent
conditioning. Or it can be transformed in a more fundamental way, as in recent
attempts to incorporate behavioral principles into the broad framework provided
by micro-economic theory (e.g., Rachlin et al. 1976). Such attempts should be
viewed as progressive developments of the behaviorist research program, rather
than as the introduction of a rival, because (1) the parameters employed in the
economic model all fit the radical behaviorist constraints; (2) the economic model
retains previously established behavioral principles as special cases, not as ad hoc
additions; (3) it has expanded the range of phenomena of which behavioral
principles offer explicit and detailed explanations; and (4) it opens up new,
potentially fruitful areas of research. Given the possibility of this kind of trans
forming change within the behaviorist program, it is even more important to
emphasize that any argument for the limits of behaviorist explanation must be
applicable to the general conceptions that define the program, and not merely to
the specific set of principles currently known.
We expect a serious argument for the inherently restricted explanatory power
of the radical behaviorist research program to spring not from a formal proof that
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behaviorist principles must be inconsistent with certain data, but from the positive
achievements of an alternative scheme. The relevant positive achievements would
be the following.
1 The alternative offers explicit and detailed explanations of a certain class
of phenomena.
2 These explanations employ parameters that violate the constraints of the
behaviorist program.
3 These explanations have some empirical support.
4 Behavioral principles currently offer no explanation of this class of phe
nomena.
5 The class of phenomena that the alternative scheme explains consists of
behavior that is reasonably regarded as characteristically human.
6 The alternative scheme is fruitful, either with respect to defining and
solving research problems, or with respect to providing an aid to practical
concerns.
7 The alternative scheme produces the current behavioral principles as
special cases, obtained when either one or more specified variables are
held constant, or under special, explicitly stated, environmental condi
tions.
8 The presuppositions or theoretical principles of the alternative scheme
imply that there exist regularities relating behavior to environmental
factors, past and present, only in settings in which specified variables are
held constant or in which specified environmental conditions obtain.
9 Repeated efforts to extend the behaviorist research program, as a gen
erator of fruitful research, to settings in which the specified variables are
not held constant, or specified environmental conditions do not obtain,
have failed.
We regard the demonstration of this list of achievements by an alternative
scheme to behaviorism as necessary and sufficient to show that behaviorism is
inherently incomplete. Moreover, such achievements would also serve to define
positively the limits of behaviorist explanation, by specifying which variables had
to be held constant, or which environmental conditions had to exist, for behavior
al principles to provide a satisfactory explanation of behavior. The production of
such an alternative scheme would not logically compel the rejection of behavior
ism. However, it is not easy to see what grounds could be used to defend
continued allegiance to behaviorism. One could not appeal to comprehensiveness
since, in the stipulated circumstances, behaviorism has been shown not to be as
comprehensive as the alternative. One could not appeal to fruitfulness since,
again by stipulation, there is at least one significant domain in which the alterna
tive scheme is more fruitful. And one could not appeal to the power to control
behavior that behavior principles yield since, once more by stipulation, that
power is restricted to a specified set of situations.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO BEHAVIORISM
A suitable alternative to behaviorism could, in principle, come from either of two
sources. It could come from a rival scientific research program, such as cognitive
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psychology. Or it could come from an explanatory scheme whose origins lie in
practical life rather than experimental research, such as that of teleological
explanation (Taylor, 1964). Whether or not they actually meet our stringent
requirements, it is fair to construe the critical arguments against behaviorism by
Chomsky (1959) and Fodor (1975) as attempts to provide an alternative scheme
from psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology. This is certainly a proper source
of an alternative to behaviorism if one shares with behaviorism the commonplace
scientific presupposition that behavior is lawful. We will not here evaluate argu
ments that spring from rival scientific research programs.
Instead, we will point to the limits of behaviorist explanation from the
perspective of the explanatory framework universally used in the deliberations of
practical life — that of teleological explanation. Let us begin by acknowledging
that behaviorist principles are manifestly exemplified in settings (both ex
perimental and applied) in which control is established. These settings exhibit the
following characteristics: only a few reinforcers are available, and usually one has
special salience; the experimenter (behavior modifier) has control over conditions
of deprivation and access to the reinforcers; there is only one, or at most a few,
available means to the reinforcers; the performance of clearly defined, specific
tasks is reinforced; different tasks are effectively interchangeable for the one that
is reinforced; the schedule of reinforcement is externally imposed and varied by
agents not themselves being subjected to the contingencies; there are no effective
alternatives to being in the setting.
We will call settings that exhibit these characteristics closed settings. Clearly,
settings can be more or less closed. The argument that follows suggests that the
exemplification of behavior principles should become increasingly discernible as
the setting becomes increasingly closed. Demonstrating that behaviorism has
explanatory success in closed settings does not suffice to show that its explanatory
principles are comprehensive, if not alt settings are closed. And many ordinary
social settings are not. We now sketch an argument, the details of which can be
found elsewhere (Schwartz and Lacey, 1982, Ch. 9; Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and
Lacey, 1978) that the explanatory power of behaviorism is limited to closed
settings. The argument is empirical in character, though primarily based on
sociological and historical rather than experimental considerations.
Experimental and applied settings are closed, and they were constructed by
behavioral psychologists in order that control be obtained in them. As a step
toward exploring the possible exemplification of behavioral principles in open
(that is, non-closed) settings, we asked if they are manifestly exemplified in any
setting of our society that was not constructed in the course of applying known
behavioral principles. There is one such setting, parts of the modern, factory
workplace. If this setting were paradigmatic of social settings in general, we would
be well on the way to defending the comprehensiveness of behaviorism. But it is
not, for two reasons. First, while this setting is ubiquitous in the modern world
(decreasingly so in the first world, increasingly so in the third), there are impor
tant courses of action (for example, creating and running the factory, or engaging
in science) that are not encompassed by it. That is, behaviorists may be able to
account for the person’s behavior within the closed setting, but they cannot
account for their own behavior in establishing it. Second, this setting, as a
significant social phenomenon, is a recent historical development, and is wide-
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spread only in industrial societies. We reached this second conclusion on the basis
of the following observations (Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and Lacey, 1978).
1

Medieval work, the precursor to modern work, cannot be analyzed as
exemplifying behavioral principles, because it was variegated, flexible,
and socially integrated.
2 Important features of the modern factory workplace emerged slowly
during the nineteenth century. As they emerged, certain customary and
traditional work practices were suppressed and gradually replaced by
wages as the worker’s predominant concern in the workplace.
3 Only with the suppression of these traditional practices did behavior in
the workplace become describable and explicable in informative detail in
terms of behavioral principles.
4 The structuring of the modern workplace was completed under the heavy
influence of the scientific management movement at the turn of this
century, in the light of principles virtually identical to those of behavior
ism.
We conclude from these observations that those settings in which behavioral
principles are manifestly exemplified are not generally characteristic of human
societies, but have been constructed in the course of recent history. Moreover,
although they are not the product of applied behavior analysis as we know it
today, they are also closed settings, in which money is the salient reinforcer. The
factory workplace, then, does not constitute evidence that behavioral principles
are exemplified outside closed settings. That this is so is bolstered by the fact that
as one moves to more open settings, in which external control is minimized,
desired outcomes are the product of lengthy, variegated, and often novel activi
ties, and plans and actions are shaped in the course of study and discussion,
behaviorist descriptive categories become less and less useful for providing illumi
nating descriptions. Instead they become more metaphorical, more parasitic on
other conceptual schemes, and more dependent upon appeals to the complex or
unknown. A striking example of this is how ‘reinforcement’ tends to take on a
vague, metaphorical usage, marred by an oft-repeated conceptual confusion.
Radical behaviorists often assert that their fundamental principle is; ‘be
havior is under the control of its consequences’, which they usually take to be
equivalent to: ‘behavior is under the control of contingencies of reinforcement.’
Thus, any consequence that controls behavior necessarily becomes a reinforcer,
from which it is often inferred that any goal of a human action is a reinforcer.
Since behavior in most open settings is goal-directed, that is, is performed in
order to bring about certain consequences, the inference would imply that this
open-setting, goal-directed behavior is controlled by reinforcement. In order to
see that this inference is invalid, note that within behavior theory, ‘behavior is
under the control of contingencies of reinforcement’ has the very precise mean
ing: ‘behavior occurs because of the contingencies of reinforcement in which
earlier instances of the behavior have been involved.’ But behavior may occur in
order to bring about a certain consequence without previous instances of the same
kind of behavior ever having been reinforced, or even having occurred. The
invention of the ‘Skinner box’, for the convenient study of free-operant behavior,
and of concurrent reinforcement schedules, for the convenient study of choice.
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and of ‘mands’ and ‘tacts’ for the analysis of verbal behavior are just a few
examples. Also, within behavior theory something is a reinforcer only if it in
creases the probability of the behaviors on which it is contingent. But there are
many goals for which a person may act that do not have this property, goals that,
once achieved, render irrelevant or unnecessary the further repetition of the
behaviors that eventuated in the achievement of the goals. For example, once
Skinner and his collaborators reached the goal of having discovered generaliza
tions about schedules of reinforcement, they moved to other experimental in
quiries. Such goals are not reinforcers.
We have concluded that there is no evidence that behavioral principles are
exemplified outside closed settings, and that in open settings, radical behaviorism
offers neither explanations nor illuminating descriptions. For completeness, our
argument would require demonstrating the inadequacy of Skinner’s ‘interpreta
tions’ of verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957), but we lack the space to do so here (see
Lacey, 1974). In contrast, teleological categories (goal, expectancy, plan, reason,
intention, etc.) are routinely successful in capturing order in human action, and m
expressing the detail, sequence, novelty, and significant variation that human
behavior displays. They are used in historical inquiry and social commentary, and
universally in charting the human environment as an apt guide to action. The
framework of teleology satisfies all the criteria we identified earlier that a serious
alternative to behaviorism would have to meet.
1
2
3
4
5

It offers explicit and detailed explanations of a certain class of phenomena
goal-directed behaviors in open settings.
These explanations employ parameters (intention, purpose, deliberation,
etc.) that violate the constraints of the behaviorist program.
These explanations have empirical support; we use them effectively to
make sense of most aspects of daily life.
Behavioral principles currently offer no explanation of this class of phe
nomena, as we have argued above.
The phenomena that the teleological framework explains are characteris

tically human.
...
6 The teleological framework is fruitful; it provides the categories that en
able effective interaction and deliberation in practical life.
7 It treats current behavioral principles as special cases, generalizations that
obtain when, and only when, the conditions defining closed settings
obtain. In these settings behavior is still purposive; that it exhibits law-hke
regularities is a consequence of the limited options and means to bring
them about that characterize closed settings. Behavior in these settings is
a special, albeit in our historical epoch, common case. Put another way,
goals become reinforcers only under the conditions of closed settings, and
behavioral principles are exemplified only when key conditions that pre
vail in open settings are suppressed.
8 More generally, the presuppositions of teleological explanation (see be
low) imply that there exist regularities relating behavior to environmental
factors, past and present, only when environmental conditions are held
sufficiently constant that intelligent variation of goals is not likely to
occur.
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Repeated efforts to extend the behaviorist research program to open
settings have failed.

We want to emphasize that while behavioral phenomena in open settings are
more complex than those in closed settings, complexity is not the key to our
argument. Closed settings are not the simplest cases on which to build additively
in order eventually to encompass complex, open cases, which is what most
behaviorist researchers assume. Rather, they are special, degenerate cases that
are properly intelligible only in the light of the teleological categories that also
illuminate open settings.
The logic of teleological explanations is quite distinct from the logic of
explanations obtained by subsuming a phenomenon under general laws, a goal to
which all behaviorist explanations aspire (see Taylor, 1964). When we say, "A had
the goal X, and A did Y because A believed that doing Y would (contribute to)
bring about W’, we do not imply that there are internal states, ^’s having goals
and beliefs, that are instances of variables in a law that subsumes ^’s doing X.
Thus, for example, the explanatory import of ‘in the 1950s, Skinner engaged in a
sustained, collaborative program of experimentation systematically investigating
schedules of reinforcement, because his goal was to formulate a comprehensive
set of behavioral principles, and he believed that reinforcement schedules were
significant variables in that set, and that his available experimental techniques
could uncover the principles of reinforcement schedules’ does not depend upon
finding laws (regularities, generalizations) linking those goals and beliefs to the
sequence of actions that constituted the carrying out of the research program. The
having of goals and beliefs is not a hypothesized internal state that has a causal
role that is explicated by laws. Rather, the connection between the having of
goals and beliefs and action is closer to a logical relation, expressed in what some
philosophers have called a ‘practical syllogism’. The idea (considerably simplified)
is this: if I say that I have the goal X and that I believe that doing Y will bring
about X, but yet I don’t do Y, then I am involved in a ‘practical contradiction’,
unless I can show that there were countervailing considerations (for example,
another goal that overrode X, another means to X, that I was prevented forcibly
from doing Y). Put another way, certeris paribus not doing Y is public evidence
that either I did not have the goal or I did not have the belief. This is an instance
of how there are public ‘criteria’ for the having of goals and beliefs (Wittgenstein,
1958). The existence of these public criteria makes possible the empirical con
firmation of attributions of goals and beliefs to a person. In addition, the order
that is discernible among actions in the course of teleological explanation does not
derive from classifying actions (behaviors) and displaying the members of the
class as regularly following members of a class of antecedent events, as would be
the case in law-like generalizations. The order derives instead from relating
actions to goals, and it varies in richness depending on its capacity to display a
wide variety, pattern, and sequence of actions as leading to the same goal. Since
there is a kind of logical (‘criterial’) connection between the having of goals and
beliefs and action, connections do not have to be defined in terms of regular
successions of classes of events; teleological explanation can rest with unique
descriptions of particular actions and still reflect order.
To challenge our argument about the limits of behaviorist explanation, it is
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necessary to show that there are settings, beyond the boundary conditions we
specified in our discussion of closed settings, in which behaviorist principles are
clearly exemplified. One must show how the teleological framework, in which
relations between explanatory factors and actions are ‘logical’ rather than causal,
can be replaced by causal laws of the behaviorist research program.

WHAT HUMAN BEINGS ARE

We have used the categories of teleological explanation, those that we use
routinely to illuminate most of practical life, in order to define positively the
boundaries of the explanatory power of behaviorist principles, and our mode of
argument has involved sociological and historical analysis. Although our analysis
is not ‘scientific’, in the sense in which science is conceived as involving the
representation of phenomena as lawful, it serves the indispensible scientific fac
tion of defining the limits or boundary conditions of known generalizations^ Our
procedure is not ad hoc, it is entirely appropriate in the light of the kind of beings
that humans are. To conclude, we will briefly outline our conception of human
beings, contrasting it with the general conception of radical behaviorism.
Like behaviorists, we regard the analysis of the relation between persons and
the environment as essential for understanding human behavior. Unlike them, we
deny that this relation can be captured in a set of regularities involving behavior
and environmental variables, except in closed settings. Characteristically, the
relation between a person and the environment is mediated by the person s
interpretation (perceptions, beliefs) of the environment, and intentions with
respect to modifying it. Interpretations and intentions may be thought to be the
province of cognitive psychologists. But they, like behaviorists, are normally m
search of laws, and we do not believe that interpretations are any more lawful
than actions are in open settings (see Fodor, 1983, for a supporting argument).
Consequently, except in closed settings, human behavior is marked by variabih y
and a certain novelty.
_
Affirming the explanatory significance and indispensibihty of interpretations
and intentions does not diminish the importance of the environment. The en
vironment is both a constraint on behavior and the object of behavior. It limits
what it is possibile to do, and what can be. done is always a modification of the
environment (never the product of ‘pure volition’). Modification of the environ
ment is the explicit object of intentions; virtually all acts presuppose a inultiphcity
of environmental conditions, and all acts are expressed m a material medium.
Beyond this we also maintain that the very obtaining of behavioral regularities
depends upon the presence of certain environmental conditions (broad socio
economic structures that convert many settings into closed ones). On this view
different regularities may obtain within different socio-economic structures, so
that the obtaining of regularities has an essential and inelimmable historicity, and
requires a social-historical analysis for its explanation. When regularities are
detached from socio-economic structures, human nature comes to be viewed as
identical with its manifestation in the particular socio-historical locale m which it
is being examined. Psychological inquiry dissociated from history always runs the
risk of this misidentification.

Hugh Lacey and Barry Schwartz

175

In other ways, too, we emphasize the social and historical character of human
action. Human beings are social beings. What they do reflects their social posi
tions and social roles, and much of what they do is directed toward generating and
maintaining various kinds of social relations. Much deliberation about what to do
concerns what is possible and appropriate given one’s social position and role,
and the positions and roles to which one can reasonably aspire. The explanation
of a person’s goals involves locating that person in the social nexus. The social
nexus in turn requires that the person participate in certain practices, or be
subjected to certain controls. Compare, for example, the role of professor in a
psychology department, which requires participation in the practice of scientific
research, with that of a worker earning piece rates in a factory, which requires
performing tasks set by management in accordance with schedules controlled by
management.
Within a practice such as scientific research, goals are understood in terms of
their appropriateness given the current state of development of a particular
research program — whether, for example, the research in question contributes to
solving an outstanding problem, to refuting a rival hypothesis, to exploring a
significant new phenomenon, to confirming a prediction that was generated by a
theory, and so on. What it makes sense to do at one time is often quite different
from what it makes sense to do at another. To understand why a researcher
performs a particular experiment, one needs to locate its relevance to the histor
ical unfolding of the research program. Actions that derive from practices become
fully articulated only in teleological and historical terms.
Within a practice, goal-setting is not merely an individual matter, for judg
ments of appropriateness ultimately involve the collective wisdom of the body of
practitioners, and novices are apprenticed into the practice in the context of this
collective authority. So proposed goals may be varied, challenged, and changed.
Goals may be changed for various reasons, for example, conditions for realizing
the goal (funding, outlets for publication) may be removed. Paradigmatically,
however, within a practice goals are changed because of criticism, argument, the
presentation of evidence — in general, through participation in dialogue. How the
practice develops is crucially the outcome of this dialogue among the practition
ers, and so a practice develops appropriate social relations among its members to
facilitate and enhance such dialogue. In contrast, dialogue among the members of
the work-force is essentially irrelevant to the setting of goals in a closed setting
like the factory, and social relations that facilitate control rather than dialogue are
thus developed.
There has always been a moral impulse behind Skinner’s driven and unrelent
ing commitment to behaviorism, a belief that the implementation of systematic
behavioral controls will contribute quickly to solving the big social problems of
the modern world (Skinner, 1971). And much of his philosophical writing has
been devoted to arguing that persons are the kind of beings defined by relations of
control. We too have a moral motive. It is that relations of dialogue in all aspects
of life are better for everyone than relations of control. So it is important for us to
take as the appropriate objects of psychological inquiry persons who are capable
of rich, dialogical relations, and to give an empirical basis to the claim that
settings in which relations of control dominate are products of historically contin
gent socio-economic structures. We have tried to do so here, and to suggest that
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human beings are what the explanatory scheme with the greatest comprehensive
ness — the teleological scheme — says they are, and that where they appear to be
otherwise, important features of humanity have been suppressed.
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